Lease records for hancock county mississippi
Whether the New Seawall was constructed on public land elsewhere in Bay St. Louis is not relevant to the instant litigation.
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But nevertheless, this Court's statement is not necessarily incorrect. Photographs admitted at trial show that, in some if not most areas near the Murphys' property, no fastlands existed between the Old Seawall and the Bay of St. Louis at the time the Final Map was completed. Louis to prevent erosion.
In either of those cases, the Final Map sets the public trust tidelands boundary at the toe of the Old Seawall. But the instant case is not one of those cases. For all these reasons, we find that the State was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis that the public trust tidelands boundary adjacent to the Murphys' property was the Old Seawall. As an alternative argument to the above issue, the State asserts that the Murphys are time-barred from bringing an action for inverse condemnation because they failed to challenge the public trust tidelands boundaries established by the Final Map within three years after the map's publication.
Statutes of limitation issues present questions of law, which this Court reviews de novo. Koestler v. Baptist Health Sys. Relying on this statute, the State asserts that the Murphys' cause of action accrued when the Final Map was published in December The State's argument is without merit. Kidd, So. The Murphys' cause of action did not accrue when the Final Map was published, as the State suggests, because the Final Map did not establish that the property in question was public trust tidelands.
Stated another way, the Murphys had no cause of action against the State in December , because they still owned the property in dispute after the Final Map was published. The Murphys did not have an enforceable cause of action for inverse condemnation until their property was actually taken by the State and the City for the purpose of constructing the municipal harbor.
The State's statute-of-limitations argument is without merit. Finding that the State is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we now address the State's alternative arguments. First, the State asserts that the trial court erred in failing to exclude inadmissible testimony by Robert Crook, the Murphys' expert witness on the subject of real estate appraisal.
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When part of a larger tract of land is taken for public use, the owner should be awarded the difference between the fair market value of the whole tract immediately before the taking, and the fair market value of that remaining immediately after the taking, without considering general benefits or injuries resulting from the use to which the land taken is to be put, that are shared by the general public. State Highway Comm'n v. Hillman, So. I applied the same market conditions adjustment as I did in the before condition and then the after condition I adjusted the sales for location because the Murphy's property no longer is a beach property.
It's an interior lot that has a bridge on the south side, a raised ramp bridge, concrete bridge, that curves and goes down to the parking lot that was built where the Murphy's property, beach property, was previously located. So if you were standing in the middle of the Murphy's property looking out towards the bay to the east you see a concrete bridge. If you look south down Beach Boulevard you see a concrete bridge above you.
You see no beach. The beach is not there. And the comparable sales were adjusted for the fact that this is a much less desirable property in the after condition after the taking. There's not that much demand for a property with physical characteristics that the property has today or as of the date of taking. On cross-examination, the State asked Crook if the Murphys held riparian and littoral rights to the property east of the Old Seawall. The following exchange then took place:. So what rights do you — is it your opinion that the rights then that are east of the seawall, southeast of the seawall, relate to riparian — the right to exercise ripatiran and littoral rights?
And what value did you assign to the value of those or what dollar amount — let me ask it that way, did you assign to the riparian and littoral rights in your appraisal? Again that would be improper appraisal practice. I appraised the value as a whole property, no individual rights of the 14, square feet.
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In the after condition you have a different per square foot value. Let's be specific. Can you give me some type of idea? You can't break that out, can you? But it is a part and component of your estimate of damages, consequential damages to the remainder, correct? On redirect examination, Crook clarified his prior statements concerning riparian and littoral rights:.
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You were asked questions about littoral and riparian rights to the water. In your understanding, and if you don't know as an appraiser maybe it's a legal question, but your understanding is ownership rights and are those rights the same thing? Crook, if this jury finds based upon the deeds, the records, the other testimony from experts that are title people that at the time this project was built, at the time that the city came on the property and took possession of the property and began building the harbor, if they find that the fee simple title was in the Murphy's [sic] and you've value [sic] that property do you value the ownership of that property for the entire property or just a portion of the property?
Is that what you did with the 14, plus square feet that you measured off that went from the right-of-way to the edge of the water? At the conclusion of Crook's testimony, the State moved to strike and exclude the entirety of his testimony because he had considered noncompensable elements in calculating the Murphys' damages. Specifically, the State argued that the Murphys could not recover for the loss of their littoral or riparian rights because the property in question was taken for a higher public purpose.
Gilich, So. Because the property in question was not previously owned by the State, the Murphys argued that they were entitled to recover for loss of access to the water. The trial court agreed with the Murphys and denied the State's motion, also noting that the State had failed to object during Crook's testimony.
This Court has held that the application of the before-and-after rule and whether the trial court erred in allowing a departure from the rule are questions of law subject to de novo review. Comm'n v. Fires, So. Hall, So. State Highway Comm'n, So. Viverette, So. Zeigler, 92 Miss. After reviewing Crook's testimony in context, we find that Crook did not include noncompensable elements of damages in his calculations.
The State's argument, that Crook improperly included the loss of littoral rights in his calculation of damages, is based on a mischaracterization of Crook's testimony. Crook did not even mention littoral or riparian rights during his direct examination. He simply explained the characteristics of the property that he considered in calculating fair market value before and after the taking, including the fact that the property no longer had access to or a view of the ocean after the taking. Havard, So.
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The trial court did not err in failing to exclude Crook's testimony. Ultimately, though, it appears that any reference to littoral rights during Crook's testimony would be harmless error, if any. The trial court affirmatively instructed the jury that it could not consider the loss of littoral rights in calculating just compensation for the taking if it found that those rights were revoked for the greater public good.
Jones Cty. This presumption is supported by the jury's verdict. Thus, even if Crook did improperly include the loss of littoral rights in his calculations, it does not appear that the jury considered those rights in its ultimate determination of just compensation. See K. Leasing, Inc.